A brief overview of modern cryptographic tools with application to Internet by Anticoli, Claud
 C
 
Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A brief overview of modern  
cryptographic tools with 
application to Internet 
 
C. Anticoli  
 
 
 
 
 
IIT B4-01/2002 
 
Nota Interna 
 
 
 
 
Maggio 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Iit 
 
Istituto di Informatica e Telematica  
1 
A brief overview of modern cryptographic tools with 
application to Internet 
Claud Anticoli 
Abstract 
Here a brief overview of some of the cryptographic tools used in Internet today is 
illustrated. This document briefly introduces cryptography starting from a short resume of 
historical events showing the evolution and role played by cryptography narrating some 
representative real life events in history. A more formal introduction mentioning the 
advantages obtainable with cryptography is then undertaken starting from symmetric and 
asymmetric cryptography. Other uses of cryptography are then explained to finally present 
two widely used communication protocols in Internet. Representative examples are 
provided reverting to a minimal mathematical approach. 
Introduction 
Information security is an issue that is receiving a growing attention in today’s society 
and one of the main reasons for this is attributable to the Internet phenomena. During 
the design of Internet, great importance was given to its functionality rather than other 
aspects, such as information security, thus making it an inadequate means for certain 
applications. The unpredictable success of Internet, however, has not been influenced 
by it’s own downfalls and it has by now proved to be a fundamental tool that cannot be 
discarded in almost all sectors of today’s economy. For this reason great effort has been 
invested in the improvement of the services offered by Internet and one of these is 
obtained using cryptographic techniques that render Internet not only a useful means of 
doing business, but at times even indispensable. In fact, through cryptographic 
techniques, one can obtain: secure communication connections, identity proof, 
electronic signatures (arguably safer than hand signing a check or credit card receipt) 
among other benefits. 
This work tries to give a general overview of the cryptographic scene and will describe 
some of the actual algorithms and protocols actually implemented by security related 
applications in Internet undertaking a minimal mathematical approach in order to give 
an idea of the typology of artifacts used. This work is intended to introduce the reader 
only to the cryptographic and algorithmic aspects that are involved in Internet omitting 
explanation of how exactly these concepts are practically implemented. 
A short section will be dedicated to the history of cryptography and intends to mention 
only few of the many cryptographic related events that have conditioned today’s 
standards. The main purpose of this section is to render the idea that cryptography is by 
no means a guaranty and history teaches us that often, whoever took this for granted 
paid serious consequences. A general description of present day ciphers will 
successively be undertaken including the introduction to one of the most sensational 
advents in cryptography during last century: the invention of asymmetric cryptography 
as a solution to the key distribution problem. 
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Other uses of cryptography will successively be presented to eventually conclude with 
two of the most famous key exchange communication protocols used in Internet: 
Kerberos and X.509. 
A short history of cryptography 
It is widely believed that cryptography dates back as far as 2000 B.C. and leads us to 
the Egyptian civilization where hieroglyphics were intentionally modified to make the 
understanding of the inscriptions more difficult. Hieroglyphics were engraved on 
tombstones narrating the story of important rulers and kings. The cryptic modifications 
were applied to make the inscriptions more intriguing to the audience but had no 
intention of hiding the text. It was believed that a story told this way, was more 
important and therefore worthy only of a ‘king’s story’. 
The first recorded evidence of cryptography used to conceal correspondence shows that 
the Spartans, around 400 B.C., employed a cipher device called a ‘scytale’ to encipher 
and decipher their messages. It consisted of a parchment tape that was wrapped around 
a baton and a message was then written on the parchment parallel to the cylinder axis. 
The parchment was then unwrapped resulting in a transposition of the clear text making 
it unreadable and very difficult for those days to decipher unless in possession of a 
baton of equal radius. 
Julius Caesar himself referred to encipherment techniques to communicate with his 
trusted collaborators of the senate and applied a mono-alphabetic substitution on the 
text by simply replacing each letter with the its preceding letter in the alphabet (e.g. ‘f’ 
becomes ‘e’, ‘a’ becomes ‘z’ and ‘yes’ becomes  ‘xdr’). 
The major downfall of these techniques is that once unmasked, they are completely of 
no use and are easily deciphered. The necessity for a different approach produced the 
first cryptographic schemes based on a ‘shared finite key’ used for the encipherment 
and decipherment of the message. This was a revolutionary discovery and indeed its 
use is still in vigor today. One of the first schemes of this type consists in a letter 
substitution according to a randomly generated key, which maps each letter to another 
in a meaningless way. This new approach implied that even if you were an expert 
cryptographer, without the key, the only apparent approach would have been to try out 
all 403 billion billion billion billion possible key combinations and verify which 
rendered a meaningful deciphered text (in reality thanks to the birthday problem this 
number is practically drastically reduced). 
It is at this point in history that the endless battle between cryptographers and 
cryptanalysts commences. The first to make significant advances in the deciphering of 
the new ‘unbreakable’ code were the Arabs, namely Qalqashandi, who wrote a book on 
how to perform frequency analysis of ciphered text in order to discover the key and 
unveil the text. This technique relies on the fact that that certain letters of the alphabet 
statistically occur more often than others so for example, for an English text, the 
ciphered letter that occurs the most is probably an ‘e’ seeing that ‘e’ is the most 
recurring letter in the English language. 
At the time this event astonished the cryptographic community because the mono 
alphabetic ciphering was thought to be ‘unbreakable’ and this typology of stupefaction 
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was destined to repeat itself endlessly to the point that even today, cryptographers are 
starting to suspect that what seemed practically impossible to decipher is not only about 
to be deciphered but is already being deciphered by institutions with adequate resources 
(e.g. military entities or government institutions). 
Queen Mary of Scots, found guilty of plotting for the English crown, was betrayed by 
her excessive trust in the fact that her ciphered correspondence was unreadable for the 
enemy. Instead the English Queen Elisabeth’s investigators were decoding her 
messages and collected enough evidence to prove her guilt and unveil all her 
collaborators which were obviously sentenced too. This was achieved by applying a 
letter frequency analysis and this story is probably the most renowned episode of how 
cryptography and cryptanalysis influenced history and the moral behind the story shows 
us the two faces of cryptography (beneficial if successful but disastrous if broken) 
After this breakthrough in cryptanalysis all efforts were aimed towards building a 
cryptographic technique, which at the time was predominantly vulnerable to the 
frequency analysis attack, immune to cryptanalysis. To this scope, a pioneer of western 
cryptography, the Italian Leon Battista Alberti, introduced the concept of a 
polyalphabetic substitution cipher where a different ‘mapping key’ is used for each 
letter and then repeated according to a certain mechanism. He also formalized the 
concept of symmetric cryptography and is considered as one the founding fathers of 
modern cryptography. Towards the 16th century the French cryptographer Blaise de 
Vigenere devised a final version of a ciphering technique that was again thought to be 
‘unbreakable’ seeing that it resisted all frequency analysis attacks until Antoine 
Rossignol discovered a mathematical property that allowed to eventually conduct a 
frequency analysis in order to break the code. In this occasion Louis XIV benefited 
from Rossignol’s discovery and obtained the Huguenots surrender by deciphering a 
message and ‘reciphering’ another message under the same key suggesting immediate 
surrender seeing that any hope of victory was futile. Louis XIV himself then later fell 
victim to the same feat when the English deciphered his messages revealing his plans 
for Poland. 
Following these advents, various finite key cryptographic mechanisms were invented 
offering variants in order to resist the known cryptanalyst attack methods but were 
systematically deciphered. An interesting aspect of this matter is that whilst 
cryptanalysts were believed to require a linguistic back round in order to succeed in 
their quest, as the systems became more complex, mathematicians slowly proved to be 
more adapt to the task. This is explained by the growing complex nature of the 
cryptographic mechanisms and the Polish mathematician Marian Rejewski achieved 
one of the most clamorous successes in the history of cryptoanalysis when he ‘broke’ 
the German Enigma code used by the German U-Boot submarines in the Atlantic 
Ocean during the Second World War. The Enigma code was widely believed to be 
‘absolutely’ secure unless the daily keys fell into enemy hands. The Germans firm 
belief in the security of the code revealed to be a fatal error leading to the defeat of their 
marine forces in the Atlantic Ocean, a key episode in the outcome of the Second World 
War. The Americans too, thanks to the deciphering of the Japanese ciphered codes, 
gained victory in the Pacific Ocean. The Enigma machine offered a mechanism that 
actuated a poly-alphabetic substitution but practically never reused the same ‘key map’. 
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This meant that each letter was coded according to a different substitution key map and 
any mapping to the same letter was apparently nothing but a mere coincidence. The 
initial setup of the machine was of vital importance and was considered as the ‘key’ for 
the message. The machine offered 15 billion billion billion initial setup configurations 
(in one it’s initial versions). Rejewski applied a mathematical property of the 
mechanism to attack the problem and reduced the amount of initial possible setup 
conditions (i.e. the daily key) to roughly 150 000 by analyzing a sufficient amount of 
clear and corresponding ciphered text. The German's use of the machine was, from a 
security point of view, inappropriate because, for example, the daily transmission of 
weather bulletins (at exact times of day) provided the allies secret services with enough 
ciphered text and corresponding clear text in order to apply Rejewski’s method. At 
Bletchley Park (a branch site of the British Secret Services) auto-mechanisms had been 
devised to manually try all the possible initial setup conditions remaining. These 
machines, called ‘bombes’, were devised by Rejewski and later developed and 
extended by Alan Turing and represent one of the first prototypes of today’s electronic 
calculators (computers). Even though the German’s tried to counter act, by augmenting 
the machines complexity or by transmitting only ‘double’ enciphered text, the allies 
almost always managed to decipher the messages by simply constructing bigger and 
faster ‘bombes’. 
There are many examples in history of cryptography used by the highest and most 
influential authorities through out the world and almost all of those based on a finite 
key mechanism have been deciphered. Cryptanalysis has played an important role in 
the outcome of many colossal events in history and perhaps the most illustrative 
example of this is the Zimmerman Telegraph episode. Arthur Zimmerman was the 
German Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1917 and in January, he sent a telegram to the 
German Ambassador in Mexico ordering him to invite Mexico to unite with Japan and 
to attack America promising the state of Texas and Arizona as a reward. This message 
was intercepted by the allies and sent immediately to America. It was this event that 
influenced America to finally abandon their neutrality and enter the the First World 
Was bringing victory to the Allies. One of the most difficult aspects of this episode was 
the handling of the information in such a way as to not raise suspicion that the 
Germans secret communications were being deciphered. Today, it is believed that 
governments purposely withheld information that would have saved lives in order to 
maintain secrecy in the deciphering abilities of the enemy code. These, however, are 
aspects of politics that go beyond the intent of this document. In fact, even though the 
historical events narrated may not appear to be pertaining to the scope of this 
document, they have been included to render an idea of the general importance and 
usage of cryptography, a lesson only 4000 years of history can teach. 
Cryptography today 
The ciphers mentioned above will now be more formally presented along with other 
types. Modern ciphers use a combination of different techniques, so it is important to 
define a basis of the cryptographic techniques available in order to obtain a synthetic 
yet precise description of those more complex. 
Before proceeding it is important to have a clear understanding of the intent and goals 
of cryptography. By definition, cryptography is the study of mathematical techniques 
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related to aspects of information security such as confidentiality, data integrity, entity 
authentication and data origin authentication. 
Cryptography can realize various objectives and a framework upon which all are 
derived is presented as five different goals, namely: 
 confidentiality is the service used to keep the content of the information 
hidden from all except those authorized, 
 data integrity is a service which addresses the unauthorized alteration of 
data, 
 data authentication is a service related to verifying a claimed identity, 
 electronic certification and digital signature provides guaranties against 
unauthorized modification and forgery of electronic documents 
 non-repudiation is a service which prevents an entity denying previous 
commitments or actions. 
By information we intend any data that is somewhat representable in a written form. 
Ciphers belong to one of two main categories. These are ciphers based on symmetric 
techniques and ciphers based on asymmetric techniques. Asymmetric ciphers were 
formalized in the late 1970’s and consist in two different methods and keys (but 
somewhat related) for ciphering and deciphering the text. Symmetrical ciphers on the 
other hand use the same key (or if not closely related) but not necessarily the same 
method to cipher and decipher messages and have existed since the invention of ‘finite 
key’ cryptographic schemes. 
Apart from the apparent differences, another factor of great relevance distinguishes the 
two techniques (even though not necessarily true always). Symmetric techniques 
require a preventive secret sharing whilst asymmetric techniques do not and can 
privilege the users in obtaining a shared secret. This latter technique, in fact, was 
formalized initially to affront the key distribution problem resulting in a new branch of 
cryptography which is today used not only to resolve prior key sharing obstacles but 
has opened a whole new scenario of the uses of cryptography. 
This work will present some renowned modern symmetric and asymmetric (public key 
schemes) techniques and will also give an overview of the protocols used to cover the 
key distribution problem. Other uses of cryptography will also be explained in a 
descriptive manner omitting ‘real life’ examples. 
Symmetric Techniques 
Of all the services of cryptography at disposition, symmetric encryption is first in the 
historical time-line of cryptography and therefore is treated first. A simple 
categorization of symmetrical cipher systems will be presented in order to then 
illustrate a few of the modern cipher algorithms used in Internet today. 
A formal definition of a symmetric encryption scheme can be the following: 
Definition: Consider an encryption scheme consisting of the sets of encryption and 
decryption transformation {Ee: e ε Κ} and {Dd: d ε Κ}, respectively, where Κ is the 
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key space. The encryption scheme is said to be symmetric-key if for each associated 
encryption/decryption key pair (e, d), it is computationally “easy” to determine d 
knowing only e, and to determine e from d. [Menezes, van Oorschot, Vanstone] 
More attention should be paid to the term “easy” but for the purposes of this document 
will be omitted. The reader should, however, be aware of the necessity and existence of 
a rigorous approach which defines “computationally easy” in a theoretical and practical 
manner. 
Block ciphers 
A block cipher is an encryption scheme which breaks up the plaintext message to be 
transmitted into strings (called blocks) of a fixed length over an alphabet and encrypts 
one block at a time as apposed to a stream cipher that simply encrypts one letter at a 
time. Below is a list and brief explanation of different categories of block ciphers 
• Simple substitution ciphers: Substitution ciphers are block ciphers which 
replace symbols (or group of symbols) by other symbols or groups of symbols. 
The number of distinct simple homophonic substitution ciphers is q! where q is 
the alphabet size (typically 26!). 
• Homophonic substitution cipher: Here, different corresponding strings 
substitute a variety of block symbols in the plaintext message. This uniforms 
letter frequency at the expense of harder deciphering and expands ciphered text 
size. 
• Poly-alphabetic substitution ciphers: A poly-alphabetic substitution cipher is 
a block cipher which uses a different key for the encoding of each 
correspondent letter in the block according to a mechanism which can depend 
on the symbol order in the block, on previous plaintext symbols of even cipher 
text symbols. Symbol frequency is not preserved which offers a great advantage 
in security making a frequency analysis more difficult. However, in many cases 
cryptoanalyzing a poly-alphabetic substitution cipher is not significantly harder 
than decoding a simple substitution cipher once the block length is determined. 
In fact, once the block length is determined, the cipher text can be divided into t 
groups (t being the block length) and a frequency analysis can be carried out on 
each group. 
• Transposition ciphers: Another class of symmetric-key ciphers is the simple 
transposition cipher, which simply permutes the symbols in a block 
• Composition of ciphers (Product Ciphers): In order to describe product 
ciphers, the concept of a composition of functions is introduced. Compositions 
are a convenient way of constructing more complicated functions from simpler 
ones. Involutions are a simple class of functions which allow deciphering of a 
text by simply reapplying the cipher scheme used to cipher the plaintext. Note 
that a composition of involutions isn't necessarily an involution itself. Simple 
substitution ciphers and transposition ciphers do not individually provide very 
high level security but a combination of the two increases this level notably 
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obtaining strong ciphers which some of the most practical and effective 
symmetric-key systems today make use of. 
Confusion is an entity which describes the extent of making the relationship between 
key and cipher text as complex as possible (usually a substitution) where as diffusion 
refers to rearranging or spreading out the bits in the message so that redundancy in the 
plaintext is spread out over the ciphertext (usually via transposition). A round is then 
defined as a process which adds confusion or diffusion and each successive round is 
supposed to increase the respective confusion or diffusion. Modern block ciphers 
should obtain both in equal measure making the ‘breaking’ of the scheme very difficult 
implementing various combinations of the above ciphers. 
Stream Ciphers 
Stream ciphers are very simple block ciphers in the sense that they have block length 
equal to one symbol. The advantages of these type of ciphers consist in the fact that 
error propagations are not serious contrary to block ciphers where the transmission 
error of even a single bit will render at least one block undecipherable if not ruin the 
whole message. Another strength is that the encryption scheme can be changed for each 
letter. They are privileged especially when data must be processed one byte at a time 
due to memory restrictions. 
A stream cipher applies simple encryption transformations according to the keystream 
being used. The keystream could be generated at random, or by an algorithm which 
generates the keystream from an initial small keystream (called a seed), or from the 
seed and previous ciphertext symbols. Such an algorithm is called a keystream 
generator. 
A very simple cipher, but very important for historical reasons, is the Vernam cipher. It 
consists of an operation on the binary message m1m2...mt by a binary key stream k1k2...kt 
of the same length producing a ciphertext string c1c2...ct where: 
 . ci = mi ⊕ ki, 1 ≤ i ≤ t 
If the key string is randomly chosen and never used again, the Vernam stream cipher is 
said to be one-time pad. A one-time pad stream cipher can theoretically be proven to be 
unbreakable, an attribute which very few (none of the most popular) modern 
commercial encryption schemes are privileged to have. 
The direct communication line (the red telephone) between the White House's Oval 
Room and the Kremlin Presidential Room is rumored to be encrypted with a Vernam 
cipher (or at least was). Naturally the cost in generating and sharing keys long enough 
imply a quantity of resources which only government institutions and few others can 
afford. 
Feistel cipher - A modern symmetric cipher 
For synthetic reasons, only one representative generalized modern block cipher will be 
illustrated seeing that any attempt in choosing a representative quantity of real 
symmetrical ciphers to illlustrate would risk being incomplete given the enormous 
amount of symmetric ciphers available. The algorithms used are usually quite laborious 
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and present no conceptual difficulties and, for real implementations, consultation of 
specialized material is advised. 
The Feistel cipher was invented in the mid 1970’s an is defined in the following 
manner: 
Definition: a Fiestel cipher is an iterated cipher mapping a 2t-bit plaintext (L0, R0), 
for t-bit blocks L0 and R0 , to a ciphertext (Rr, Lr), through an r-round process where 
r ≥ 1. For 1 ≤ i ≤ r, round i maps (Li−1, Ri−1)Ki(Li, Ri) as follows: 
 Li = Ri−1, Ri = Li−1 ⊕ f(Ri−1, Ki),  
where each subkey Ki is derived from the cipher key K. 
Typically in a Feistel cipher, r ≥ 3 and often is even. The Feistel structure specifically 
orders the ciphertext output as (Rr, Lr) rather than (Lr, Rr), the blocks are exchanged 
from their usual order after the last round. Decryption is thereby achieved using the 
same r-round process but with sub-keys used in reverse order, Kr through K1. The f 
function of the Feistel cipher may be a product cipher and f itself need not be invertible 
to allow inversion of the Feistel cipher. 
The Feistel cipher lies at the base of one of the most famous symmetric ciphers 
recognized world-wide, the Data Encryption Standard (DES). The key length of DES is 
56 bits long and rumor has it that this was intentionally limited to allow electronic 
surveillance by federal institutes in America. Today DES is no longer in use and has 
been replaced by an extended version with a 128 bit key and is know as Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES). 
Asymmetric techniques (Public-key cryptography) 
One of the greatest downfalls of symmetric schemes is the need to share keys. This 
defect is a renowned challenge called 'the key distribution problem' and was publicly 
solved in the 1970’s. The necessity in sharing a key increases the difficulties involved 
in establishing cryptographic communications influencing mostly practical aspects as 
well as economic especially in a context as Internet where users might need to 
communicate with unfamiliar entities but nevertheless need certain assurances. 
Asymmetric or public-key cryptography is a concept that was developed by Martin 
Hellman and Whitfield Diffie and was introduced in the mid 1970's even though the 
British secret services claim that the agent J .H. Ellis preceded them in the same 
discovery years before. Hellman and Diffie were particularly interested in resolving the 
key distribution problem and joined forces. 
After various attempts, Hellman eventually came up with an idea that sealed the 
invention and is worth illustrating because summarizes the essential concept of public 
key cryptography. Suppose Anne wants to communicate with Bob in a confidential way 
so that Eve will not be able to intercept and read the message. Anne can write a 
ciphered message and send it via post. Even if Eve, who coincidentally works at the 
post-office, intercepts the message she will not be able to violate the code but neither 
will Bob be able to decipher the text unless Anne and Bob share a key. Now if 
obtaining a shared key is practically impossible (for whatever reason) this represents a 
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seemingly insurmountable obstacle. They could phone each other, but this isn’t totally 
secure seeing that Eve could intercept the phone call and gain knowledge of the secret 
key and use it to decipher the messages. Anne and Bob, after various experiments, 
come up with an idea which eventually solves their dilemma. Bob purchases a robust 
lock and sends it to Anne without locking it and with out the key. He keeps the key and 
all Anne has to do upon receiving the open lock is to use it to seal a metal box with the 
cleartext message inside and thereafter post it. If Eve gains possession of the box she 
will not be able to interfere seeing that even though she did witness the lock being sent 
from Bob to Anne, unfortunately the key was not included. When Bob eventually 
receives the box, he will be the only one in possession of the key and will be able to 
open the lock and recover the message. Note that, not even Anne, once she has locked 
the box is able to recuperate the message. 
Public Key Infrastructures work this way: Certificate Authorities (Trusted Third Parties 
or TTL’s) take the responsibility of keeping many of Bob’s ‘open locks’ and deliver 
them to whoever requests one in order to send and encrypted message to Bob. The 
certificate authority supplies guaranties on the origin and authenticity of the lock but is 
by no means able to open closed locks. The locks are an analogy of public keys, used to 
cipher messages and only in possession of the private key can the message be 
deciphered. Anyone can gain possession of a public key and cipher a message destined 
to Bob, but if only Bob possesses the corresponding private key (note that he himself 
generated the private and corresponding public key) he will be the only entity able to 
recover the plain text message. 
Hellman and Diffie suspected that any eventual practical implementation of their 
invention would revert to one-way functions. One-way functions can be defined in the 
following way: 
Definition: A function f from a set X to Y is called a one-way function is f(x) is 
“easy” to compute for all x ε  X but for “essentially all” elements y ε  Im(f) it is 
“computationally infeasible” to find any x ε  X such that f(x)=y. [Menezes, van 
Oorschot, Vanstone] 
Again, a rigorous definition of the terms “easy” and “computationally infeasible” is 
necessary but would detract from the simple idea being conveyed. For the purposes of 
this work, the intuitive meaning will suffice. A sub-set of mathematics which is rich of 
one-way functions is modular arithmetic’s and indeed it is in this field that the first 
asymmetric algorithms invented originate from. 
After their discovery, Hellman and Diffie then tried to find an algorithm (supposedly 
based on a one-way function) which practically achieved the advantages of their public-
key scheme , however they were unable to resolve the new challenge and were destined 
to be preceded by three MIT researchers: Rivest, Shamir and Adleman . These latter 
invented and patented the first public scheme algorithm named RSA after the authors. 
Hellman and Diffie did, however, manage to invent previously a scheme which 
partially resolved the key distribution problem and is illustrated below even though its 
collocation would better suit the Key Establishment Protocol chapter. It is presented 
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here because formally it was invented before RSA and probably helped reach the final 
version of the first public-key algorithm (i.e. RSA)1. 
The Diffie Hellman problem is simpler to understand than the RSA scheme and is 
usefulto understand the more complex RSA scheme and clearly illustrates how modular 
arithmetic’s fit’s into asymmetric cryptography. The notations are standard and 
common in literature. Brief explanations in the footnotes are given but for unfamiliar 
readers a consultation of adequate material is advised. 
SUMMARY: A and B each send the other one message over an open channel. 
RESULT: shared secret K known to both parties A and B. 
One-time setup. An appropriate prime p and generator α of Z*p (2≤ α ≤ p-2) are 
selected and published2. 
Protocol messages. 
 A  B: αx mod p (1) 
 A  B: αy mod p (2) 
Protocol actions. Perform the following steps each time a shared key is required. 
 A chooses a random secret x, 1 ≤ x ≤ p-2, and sends B message (1). 
 B chooses a random secret y, 1 ≤ y ≤ p-2, and sends A message (2). 
 B receives αx and computes the shared key as K = (αx)y mod p. 
 A receives αy and computes the shared key as K = (αy)x mod p. 
The key agreement does provide end users with a shared secret but it has various 
downfalls. The main downfall is the necessity of message exchange before the secret is 
shared and this is not suitable for applications such as e-mail where receivers are not 
necessarily on-line ready to accommodate the protocol therefore the key distribution 
problem was solved only partially. This downfall is not present in the RSA scheme 
below. 
RSA Public-Key Scheme 
Rivest, with the help of Shamir and Adleman invented an algorithm which relies on 
modular arithmetic’s as foreseen. The RSA cryptosystem is the most widely used 
public-key cipher mechanism and can be used to provide both secrecy and digital 
signatures (see later). The RSA encryption scheme uses a public key to encrypt a 
message and the private key to decrypt the ciphertext. The keys are generated as 
following: 
                                                 
1 Again the British Secret services claim that one of their mathematicians, Clifford Cocks, invented the 
scheme years before it’s public release. Funnily enough, Clifford Cocks parted immediately from the 
idea of public-key encryption formalized by Ellis and discovered what in substance was to be patented as 
RSA whilst the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol was discovered successively by yet another of the 
secret services mathematicians, Malcolm Williamson before Diffie and Hellman 
2 Z*p is the multiplicative group of Zp (i.e. all elements x of Z ∈ [0, p) such that gdc(x, p) = 1 (co primes) 
and α is a primitive element of Z*p such that αt ≡ 1 (mod p) where t is the order of the multiplicative 
group (number of elements) 
11 
SUMMARY: each entity creates an RSA public key and a corresponding private key. 
Each entity A should do the following: 
Generate two different large random primes p and q, each roughly the same size. 
Compute n=pq and φ=(p-1)(q-1). 
Select a random integer e, 1<e<φ, such that gcd(e, φ)=1. 
Use the extended Euclidean algorithm3 to compute the unique integer d, 1<d<φ, such 
that ed≡1 (mod φ). 
A’s public key is (n, e); A’s private key is d. 
The algorithm for the message encryption and decryption is as follows: 
SUMMARY: B encrypts a message for A, which A decrypts. 
Encryption: B should do the following: 
 Obtain A’s authentic public key (n, e). 
 Represent the message as an integer m in the interval [0, n-1]. 
 Compute c = me mod n. 
 Send the ciphertext c to A. 
Decryption. To recover plaintext m from c, A should do the following: 
 Use the private key d to recover m = cd mod n. 
The proof that this works is omitted but can be easily found in literature. 
The task faced by a passive adversary is that of recovering plaintext m from the 
corresponding ciphertext c, given the public information (n, e) of the intended receiver 
A. This is called the RSA problem (RSAP) and one possible approach which an 
adversary could employ to solving the RSA problem is to first factor n, and then 
compute φ and d just as A did. Once d is obtained, the adversary can decrypt any 
ciphertext intended for A. This can be proven to be as difficult as the factorization 
problem: given the public key, finding the private key is as “hard” as factorizing a very 
big number which formally takes O((log3n)lglglg n) bit operations. 
There are other possible typologies of attacks but none have yet sufficed to discourage 
it’s current use and the RSA schemes remains today the most widely used public-key 
encryption and signature scheme. The RSA signature scheme is achieved in a very 
similar way and will be illustrated later. 
ElGamal public-key encryption 
The ElGamal public-key encryption scheme is similar to the Diffie-Hellman key 
agreement (see later) mechanism and its security is based on the intractability of also 
the discrete logarithm problem. 
Definition: The discrete logarithm (LDP) problem is the following: given a prime p, 
a generator α of Z*p(multiplicative group of Zp), and an element β ε Z*p, find the 
integer x, 0 ≤ x ≤ p-2, such that: 
  αx ≡ β  (mod p). 
Below is the description of the key generation: 
                                                 
3 [Meenzes, van Oorshot and Vandstone] Algorithm 2.107 
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SUMMARY: each entity creates a public key and a corresponding private key. 
Each entity A should do the following: 
 Generate a large random prime p and a generator α of Z*p. 
 Select a random integer a, 1 ≤ a ≤ p-2, and compute αa mod p. 
 A’s public key is (p, α, αa); A’s private key is a. 
Whereas the encryption scheme is the following: 
SUMMARY: B encrypts a message m for A, which A decrypts. 
Encryption: B should do the following: 
 Obtain A’s authentic public key (p, α, αa). 
 Represent the message as an integer m in the range {0, 1,…,p-1}. 
 Select a random integer k, 1 ≤ k ≤ p-2. 
 Compute γ = αk mod p and δ = m• (αa)k mod p. 
 Send the ciphertext c = (γ , δ) to A. 
Decryption. To recover plaintext m from c, A should do the following: 
 Use the private key a to compute γp-1-a mod p (note: γp-1-a = γ-a = α-ak). 
 Recover m by computing (γ-a) •δ mod p. 
The decryption of the above algorithm allows recovery of original plaintext because 
  γ--a•δ = α-ak•m•αak = m   (mod p). 
Symmetric-key vs. public-key cryptography 
Symmetric-key and public-key encryption schemes have various advantages and 
disadvantages, some of which are common to both. This section highlights a number of 
these and summarizes features pointed out in previous sections. 
Advantages of symmetric-key cryptography 
1. Symmetric-key ciphers can be designed to have high rates of data throughput. 
Some hardware implementations achieve encrypt rates of hundreds of 
megabytes per second, while software implementations may attain throughput 
rates in the megabytes per second range. 
2. Keys for symmetric-key ciphers are relatively short. 
3. Symmetric-key ciphers can be employed as primitives to construct various 
cryptographic mechanisms including pseudorandom number generators, hash 
functions, and computationally efficient digital signature schemes, to name just 
a few. 
4. Symmetric-key ciphers can be composed to produce stronger ciphers. Simple 
transformations which are easy to analyze, but on their own weak, can be used 
to construct strong product ciphers. 
5. Symmetric-key encryption is perceived to have an extensive history, although it 
must be acknowledged that, notwithstanding the invention of rotor machines 
earlier, much of the knowledge in this area has been acquired subsequent to the 
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invention of the digital computer, and, in particular, the design of the Data 
Encryption Standard in the early 1970s. 
Disadvantages of symmetric-key cryptography 
1. In a two-party communication, the key must remain secret at both ends. 
2. In a large network, there are many key pairs to be managed. Consequently, 
effective key management requires the use of an unconditionally trusted TTP. 
3. In a two-party communication between entities A and B, sound cryptographic 
practice dictates that the key be changed frequently, and perhaps for each 
communication session. 
4. Digital signature mechanisms arising from symmetric-key encryption typically 
re-quire either large keys for the public verification function or the use of a 
TTP. 
Advantages of public-key cryptography 
1. Only the private key must be kept secret (authenticity of public keys must, 
however, be guaranteed). 
2. The administration of keys on a network requires the presence of only a 
functionally trusted TTP as opposed to an unconditionally trusted TTP. 
Depending on the mode of usage, the TTP might only be required in an “off-
line” manner, as opposed to in real time. 
3. Depending on the mode of usage, a private key/public key pair may remain 
unchanged for considerable periods of time, e.g., many sessions (even several 
years). 
4. Many public-key schemes yield relatively efficient digital signature 
mechanisms. The key used to describe the public verification function is 
typically much smaller than for the symmetric-key counterpart. 
5. In a large network, the number of keys necessary may be considerably smaller 
than in the symmetric-key scenario. 
Disadvantages of public-key encryption 
1. Throughput rates for the most popular public-key encryption methods are 
several orders of magnitude slower than the best known symmetric-key 
schemes. 
2. Key sizes are typically much larger than those required for symmetric-key 
encryption, and the size of public-key signatures is larger than that of tags 
providing data origin authentication from symmetric-key techniques. 
3. No public-key scheme has been proven to be secure (the same can be said for 
block ciphers). The most effective public-key encryption schemes found to date 
have their security based on the presumed difficulty of a small set of number-
theoretic problems. 
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4. Public-key cryptography does not have as extensive a history as symmetric-key 
encryption, being discovered only in the mid 1970s. 
Further uses of cryptography 
Up to now symmetric and asymmetric techniques have been presented and their 
immediate and most intuitive use is the concealing of messages in order to obtain 
confidentiality. There are however other advantages which can be achieved through the 
use of cryptography and they have been mentioned above. This section will briefly 
present these other uses of cryptography excluding confidentiality. Some of these 
benefits were mostly invented after the invention of asymmetric cryptography which 
not only permitted to resolve the key distribution problem but enriched the utility of 
cryptography. 
Digital Signatures 
These techniques are designed to provide the digital counterpart to handwritten 
signatures and can be achieved using cryptography. In substance a digital signature of a 
message is a number dependant on some secret known only to the signer and on the 
content of the message being signed. Signatures must be verifiable without requiring 
access to the signers secret information. The idea is similar to asymmetric cryptography 
but it is complimentary. Whereas in public-key encryption schemes, the public key is 
used to encrypt the message and the private key to decrypt, digital signatures are 
obtained generating a number using the private key and verified with the public key. 
Digital signatures have many applications in information security, including 
authentication, data integrity, and non-repudiation. One of the most significant 
applications of digital signatures is the certification of public keys in large networks. 
Certification is a means for a trusted third party (TTP) to bind the identity of a user to a 
public key, so that at some later time, other entities can authenticate a public key 
without assistance from a trusted third party. It now becomes clear how asymmetric 
cryptography surmounts the key distribution problem. A user, destined to receive an 
encrypted message, can send his certificate containing his public key issued by a TTL 
or Certificate Authority. The receiver, who desires to encrypt and send the message, 
can authenticate that the certificate was issued by the common Certificate Authority 
(CA) using the CA public key thus acquiring the guaranty that the public key received 
belongs to the intended recipient (aor at least the CA’s guaranty). 
The first method discovered was the RSA signature scheme (an RSA public key 
encryption compliment scheme) and is still widely used in Internet together with 
another digital scheme called Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) proposed by the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and is the first digital signature 
scheme to be recognized by any government (1991). 
Below is an illustration of the RSA digital scheme leaving DSA for further consultancy 
of dedicated material. The RSA signature scheme key generation is the same as for 
RSA public key encryption which represents an advantage allowing the use of the same 
private key to both decrypt and sign messages whilst the public key can be used to 
encrypt and verify messages. The public key consists of the pair (n, e) whilst the private 
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key is d (see above RSA public key encryption key generation) and RSA signing 
scheme is as follows: 
SUMMARY: entity A signs a message m ∈ M. Any entity B can verify A’s signature 
and recover the message m from the signature. 
Signature generation: Entity A should do the following: 
 Compute m` = R(m)4, an integer in the range [0; n−1]. 
 Compute s = m`d mod n. 
 A’s signature for m is s. 
Verification: To verify A’s signature s and recover the message m, B should: 
 Obtain A’s authentic public key (n, e). 
 Compute m` = se mod n. 
 Verify that m` ∈ ΜR; if not, reject the signature. 
 Recover m = R−1(m`). 
If s is a signature for a message m, then s ≡ m`d mod n where m` = R(m).Since ed ≡ 1 
(mod φ), se ≡ m`ed ≡ m` (mod n). Finally, R−1(m`) = R−1(R(m)) = m. 
Data Integrity and message authentication 
Assurances are typically required both that data actually came from its reputed source 
(data origin authentication), and that its state is unaltered (data integrity). These issues 
can-not be separated - data which has been altered effectively has a new source; and if a 
source cannot be determined, then the question of alteration cannot be settled (without 
reference to a source). Integrity mechanisms thus implicitly provide data origin 
authentication, and vice versa. Cryptography helps obtain these assurances and in the 
field a wide use of hash functions is implemented amongst other cryptographic 
functions 
Definition: A hash function is a function h which has, as a minimum, the following 
two properties: 
1. compression — h maps an input x of arbitrary finite bit length, to an output 
h(x) of fixed bit length n. 
2. ease of computation —given h and an input x, h(x) is easy to compute. 
Hash functions are used for data integrity in conjunction with digital signature schemes 
where for several reasons a message is typically hashed first and then the hash-value, as 
a representative of the message, is signed in place of the original message. A distinct 
class of hash functions, called message authentication codes (MACs), allows message 
authentication by symmetric techniques. MAC algorithms may be viewed as hash 
functions which take two functionally distinct inputs, a message and a secret key, and 
produce a fixed-size (say n-bit) output, with the design intent that it be infeasible in 
practice to produce the same output without knowledge of the key. MACs can be used 
to provide data integrity and symmetric data origin authentication, as well as 
identification in symmetric-key schemes. 
                                                 
4 R(x) is a redundancy function chosen and publicly known 
 R: M  Zn where M is the message space 
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A typical usage of (unkeyed) hash functions for data integrity is as follows. The hash-
value corresponding to a particular message x is computed at time T1 . The integrity of 
this hash-value (but not the message itself) is protected in some manner. At a 
subsequent time T2 , the following test is carried out to determine whether the message 
has been altered, i.e., whether a message x` is the same as the original message. The 
hash-value of x’ is computed and compared to the protected hash-value; if they are 
equal, one accepts that the inputs are also equal, and thus that the message has not been 
altered. The problem of preserving the integrity of a potentially large message is thus 
reduced to that of a small fixed-size hash-value. Since the existence of collisions is 
guaranteed in many-to-one mappings, the unique association between inputs and hash-
values can, at best, be in the computational sense. A hash-value should be uniquely 
identifiable with a single input in practice, and collisions should be computationally 
difficult to find (essentially never occurring in practice). 
Key establishment protocols 
Here the act of sharing a key is presented along with related cryptographic techniques 
which provide shared secrets between two parties. There are, however, many protocols 
which allow for more than two parties, belonging to group, to share secrets in a 
mutually exclusive way. In this document only protocols which involve two parties and 
a Trusted Third Party used in Internet are presented. The two most used protocols for 
sharing key over Internet are Kerberos (based on symmetric techniques) and the X.509 
(based on asymmetric techniques) will be considered in detail. 
Kerberos authentication protocol 
Kerberos is key transport protocol based on symmetric encryption. This technique 
requires a prior key sharing on behalf of two parties A, B with a Trusted Third Party T. 
Let’s call the keys KAT and KBT. Here a session key k is chosen by T and sent to A upon 
request. A then sends the session key k to B and starts the communication. 
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SUMMARY: A interacts with trusted server T and party B. 
RESULT: entity authentication of A to B with key establishment. The notations used 
are found in footnote 
Notations: 
 E is a symmetric encryption algorithm. 
 NA is a nonce chosen by A; TA is a timestamp from A’s local clock. 
 k is the session-key chosen by T ,to be shared by A and B. 
 L indicates a validity period (called the “lifetime”).One-time setup. A and T 
share a key KAT; similarly, B and T share KBT. 
Protocol messages. 
  A  T : A; B; NA    (1) 
  A  T : ticketB5; EKAT (k, NA, L, B)  (2) 
  A  B : ticketB; authenticator6  (3) 
  A  B : Ek(TA, B*subkey )   (4) 
With this protocol a big issue is the fact that the Trusted Third Party generated the key 
and is in it’s possession. In a way this avoids that only one of the entities absolves this 
task and thus obtaining a privileged position but this can easily be overcome. The next 
protocol allows for two parties to share a key without the need of the TTL to generate 
the secret key. 
X.509 authentication protocol 
This is a key transport mechanism based on asymmetric techniques. The main 
difference with the protocol above is that here the key is chosen by the end users i.e. 
parties A and B. The Trusted Third Party participates passively and will never be in 
possession of the key. The TTL, in this case acts as a Certificate Authority providing 
the means forverifying authenticity of A’s and B’s certificates. 
SUMMARY: A sends B one message, and B responds with one message. 
RESULT: mutual entity authentication and key transport with key authentication. 
Notations. 
 PX(y) denotes the result of applying X’s encryption public key to data y. 
 SX(y) denotes the result of applying X’s signature private key to y. 
 rA, rB are never re-used numbers (to detect replay and impersonation). 
 certX is a certificate binding party X to a public key suitable for both encryption 
and signature verification. 
System setup. 
 Each party has its public key pair for signatures and encryption. 
 A must acquire (and authenticate) the encryption public key of B a priori. 
Protocol messages. (An asterisk denotes items are optional.) 
  A  B : certA, DA, SA(DA)7   (1) 
  A  B : certB, DB, SB(DB)8   (2) 
                                                 
5 ticketB = EKBT (k; A; L) and  
6 authenticator = Ek(A, TA; A*subkey) 
7 DA = (tA, rA, B, data1*, PB(k1)*) 
8 DB = (tB, rB, A, rA, data2*, PA(k2)*) 
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Conclusions 
In this document a brief overview of cryptography was presented aiming to illustrate 
the goals one can achieve with modern cryptography. The context was applied to the 
Internet scenario and the algorithms briefly introduced were chosen to represent real 
cryptographic applications used in Internet. A short history of cryptography was 
included with the intent of rendering the importance of the role played by cryptography 
in today’s society quoting real cryptographic related episodes in history. The future of 
cryptography depends on the technologies available and future inventions. 
Cryptography, as is today, is from a mathematical point of view not perfect. For 
example a lot of the asymmetric algorithms base their level of security on the 
intractability of well-known mathematical problems which are only “believed” to be 
unsolvable but have never been formally proven such as the factorization problem or 
discrete logarithm problem. 
Great relevance was given to the key distribution problem and how asymmetric 
cryptography helped resolve this even though it is not the only solution. A detailed 
description of simple ciphers was presented to then use the concepts developed to 
illustrate the Feistel-cipher, bases of some of the most frequent ciphers used in Internet 
today. Other uses of cryptography such as electronic digital signatures and data 
integrity and authenticity checks were then explained. 
Cryptography is a vast science and new algorithms are continuously being studied and 
developed. This science merits more attention during practical implementations 
because as history teaches us, cryptography presents two faces. It has happened that 
clamorous flaws have been discovered in the actual algorithms, already implemented in 
security applications, causing great nuisance and at times even damage. The use 
cryptography provides us with the tools needed to keep at pace with the ever changing 
world and slowly our daily lives will rely more and more on the benefits offered by a 
cryptography not to mention a ‘secure’ Internet. 
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